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SUMMARY
Several close observers of African economic development believe that political
instability (PI) has stunted economic progress in Africa by decreasing private
entrepreneurial activity. However, whether African entrepreneurs themselves
regard PI as an obstacle or an opportunity, how they respond to it and how it
affects their behaviour as entrepreneurs are questions yet unanswered. This
inquiry is the central focus of the paper. The evidence from the African
business and political literature, periodicals and daily newspapers suggests
no simple, direct relationships between PI, the volume of entrepreneurial
activity and national welfare. On the other hand, different kinds of PI tend
to create different sets of opportunity conditions for profitable
entrepreneurial, initiatives. African entrepreneurs have responded rationally
to potentially high private pay-offs resulting from PI and resorted to
survival strategies to offset perceived and real obstacles. A considerable
part of these initiatives are socially unproductive, suggesting the need for
African governments to forge mutually beneficial coalitions with entrepreneurs
in order to increase national welfare. The real problem is whether reliable
coalitions are feasible.
1. INTRODUCTION
The African historical record lends no support to the familiar idea that
political instability (PI) decreases entrepreneurial activity. However, the
evidence does confirm that different kinds of PI encourage or deter different
forms of entrepreneurship. As a result, three decades of unstable political
climate in sub-Saharan Africa have changed the character of its indigenous
business sector. Indeed, the identity of entrepreneurs, the formality or
informality of their enterprises and their degree of creative adaptation,
expansion or innovation have all been determined in part by political
instability.
Those who see political instability as a curb on enterprise argue that
it induces frequent and unforeseeable changes - and hence uncertainty - in the
rules of business activity. This interferes with politically feasible sets
of coalitions assembled by the entrepreneur and so prevents him or her from
operating profitably in the legal or formal economy. Under conditions of
instability, state controls intensify excluding the entrepreneur from the
mainstream economy and leaving him to carry on his activities underground.
The resulting reduction in formal economic activity reduces the state's
limited tax base. Moreover, continued instability often leads to withdrawal
of foreign financial assistance. As a result, economic development is stunted
(Mbaku 1989, pp.58-59). Another version of this thesis asserts that
uncertainty arising from PI diminishes the entrepreneur's rewards and
contribution to the economy by reducing the availability and marginal
productivities of factors of production and disrupting the timing and
organization of the production process. Production failure is usually
accompanied by increased risk of capital loss and emigration of
entrepreneurial and managerial expertise to escape financial hardships and
personal political harassment. In this way, the scope of entrepreneurial
activity is curtailed (Fosu 1992, pp.830-831).
A major conceptual problem underlying many investigative studies on
Africa is that they are based on simplified assumptions about the nature of
political instability (McGowan and Johnson 1984; Mbaku 1987; Fosu 1992).
Fosu's study, for example, applies an index of political instability at the
elite level, taken to mean successful, attempted or planned coups d'etat as
proxy for political instability in multiple regressions based on a production
function framework to show that political instability has a deleterious impact
on economic growth (and entrepreneurship) in sub-Saharan Africa. It ignores
other important kinds of PI which are the outcome of contradictions in the
role of the modern African government.
The present paper defines political instability as "the condition in
political systems in which the institutionalized patterns of authority break
down and the expected compliance to political authorities is replaced by
violence intended to change the personnel, policies or sovereignty of the
authorities through injury to persons or property. It is the result of
conflict between different groups over the values according to which rewards
are allocated in the political system" (Morrison 1989, pp.122-123). Five
types of conflict - elite, factional, communal, mass and popular - are
examined. The definition of entrepreneurs used here is taken from Marsde^ as
those who "innovate and assume risks. They hire and manage labour1 forces.
They open up markets. They find new combinations of materials process and
products. They initiate change and facilitate adjustment in dynamic
economies" (Marsden 1990, p.l). The aim of the paper is to examine from the
available literature how seriously African entrepreneurs regard the problem
of political instability, how they respond to it, and how it affects their
behaviour as entrepreneurs. In the next section the origin of PI is traced
to the fragility of modern African governments. The opportunity conditions
so created are outlined in a descriptive model in section three. Section four
examines entrepreneurs' responses to these conditions and section five
concludes the paper.
2. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND THE MODERN AFRICAN GOVERNMENT
Clapham (1991, p.91) suggests that the modern African government
typically contradicts itself in exercising its functions (the purpose for
which it exists), its power (what it is able to do) and its accountability
(the relationship between itself and the people it governs). First, the state
provides basic public needs and the opportunity for individuals to pursue
their own goals. However, it frequently grants favours and opportunities for
individuals and groups at the expense of their fellows. Second, the country's
economic power base and the government's legitimacy, or the moral basis for
government, are usually weak, which means it either exercises too much power
to survive or too little for fear of rebuttal. Third, its own values and
those of civil society which it governs are often irreconcilable. These
contradictions usually leave the government fragile and at odds with civil
society. The government naturally resorts to the politics of control rather
than practise political democracy in order to safeguard its stability and
power. Private enterprise, the means by which individuals acquire wealth and
power outside government, becomes a threat which must either be frustrated or
lured to subjugate to government control. The conflict that ensues is not
only between government and private business but also between government and
other social groups - students, professionals, academics, chiefs and religious
leaders - who are affected by government action. Another dimension of the
conflict takes place among a broad range of social groups competing to
influence political decision (Chazan et a.1. 1988).
This kind of conflict, is classified as elite conflict and takes the form
of lobbying, petitions, demonstrations and strikes in a vicious interaction
of bad politics and poor economic management. When intense it escalates into
coup attempts cind successful coups d'etat. And when injudiciously handled the
elites themselves organise their constituencies on the basis of class and
ethnic identity to make factional demands. For example, divisions frequently
arose between ideologues and technocrats in Nyerere's Tanzania and in Mobutu's
Zaire, in which party functionaries, senior civil servants and military
personnel contested among themselves to curry favour with the president. The
continuous factional conflicts in Nigeria, Cameroon and Sudan are caused by
ethno-regional leaders competing for political control. In Kenya, Zambia and
Nigeria government has responded to factional conflicts by appointing
factional leaders to political decision-making positions. Some military
regimes in Ghana (between 1969 and 1979) and Nigeria (in 1979) avoided
factional conflicts by succumbing to demands to transfer power to civilian
governments. However, the Biafran succession from Nigeria (1967-70) resulted
from failure of the Federal Government to accede to factional demands.
To the extent that the Biafran succession developed into a full-scale
war, it may be classified together with the Katanga succession in Congo (1.960-
63), the Sudanese civil wars (1955 and 1962-72) and the civil wars in Chad as
communal conflicts. By definition, they are "violent actions by members of
one or more communal groups to challenge the state's territorial integrity and
protest existing distribution of authority and reward with the aim of
redistributing them among communal groups or between communal groups and the
national government" (Chazam et al. 1988, p.191; Morrison, 1991, p.123).
Another type of PI is mass conflict and involves revolts or revolutions
in which insurgents of a political movement attack agents and supporters of
established political authority (Morrison 1991, p.124). Mass conflict is rare
in Africa with exceptions such as the Ethiopian revolution which transformed
the entire social order following the overthrow of the monarchy. However,
popular conflict, in the sense of popular acts of protest and disengagement
from formal authority by communities and groups who are socio-economically
dislocated, is widespread in Africa in the form of "informal" activities.
This form of response reflects a quest for protection from uncertainty, an
attempt to control accessible resources in as many ways as possible and a
willingness on the part of the deprived to reduce susceptibility to misery
(Chazan et al. 1988, p.199). In Ghana, Nigeria, Somalia, Zaire, Kenya, Angola
and elsewhere, the informal activities are organised through various
institutions such as trading alliances, craft guilds and women's associations.
But they are not always non-violent. Anti-social activities ranging from
armed robbery and gangsterism to black market activities have thrived in the
past three decades (Chazan et al. 1988, pp.199-200).
No African country is free from any one of these five kinds of political
conflict. Different types of conflict appear in different combinations in
various countries at stages of the process of political maturing. Political
instability does not necessarily have a negative impact on the entrepreneurial
role. Out of the various types of conflict, new kinds of political coalitions
appear and new entrepreneurial opportunities emerge. The next section
explores this thesis.
3. OPPORTUNITY CONDITIONS FOB AFRICAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL
The following model is based on suggestive evidence from the
entrepreneurship literature and defines the theoretical basis of the paper
(Broehl 1982; Wilken 1987; Baumol 1988):
(a) Entrepreneurs will generally undertake activities most likely to yield
personal wealth and position regardless of whether the activities
contribute to productivity increase, economic growth or increase in per
capita income (national welfare).
(b) As entrepreneurship is not always productive, it is likely to influence
national welfare not only by its size but also by the direction it takes.
(c) The size and direction of entrepreneurship are dependent on the
entrepreneurs' private profits or the rewards and incentives offered by
current institutional arrangements.
(d) In less developed areas, such as Africa, entrepreneurs seek and realize
business advantage more often through political coalitions than through
market interactions. Private profits can be substantial under conditions
of political instability.
(e) Profits are a function of the type of political conflict which in turn
determine the degree of threat to the security of government. The degree
of insecurity of government determines the extent of government control,
the nature of government-business relationships, and so the security of
person and property of the entrepreneur, uncertainty and risk of capital
loss.
(f) The government-business variable appears in a general model of
entrepreneurial supply (the size of entrepreneurship) as S, where
productive entrepreneurship (+E) is equated with national welfare (Y) and
is a dependent variable on the function of economic conditions (X) and
non-economic conditions (Z) and S such that:
+E = Y = f(X, Z) + S
The S variable is assumed to be promotional, protective or corrective of
business or antagonistic to it. Moreover, it is exogenous and so
influences all other variables namely Z X and E.
(g) Determinants of the X variable are the availability and quality of
production factors and size and composition of the market. They influence
E and Y to the same extent.
(h) The non-economic factors in Z which promote entrepreneurship include:
social integration and mobility, non-marginality, high entrepreneurial
legitimacy and pro-entrepreneurship ideology and high institutional
(social and political) security.
The relationship between insecurity arising from political conflict and
entrepreneurship has received diverse interpretations in the literature. Many
authors believe that insecurity of all forms increases governmental
interference and control, creates uncertainties and threatens the entrepreneur
with unnecessary risk as asserted by the primacy of the PI thesis (Easterbrook
1949; Brozen 1954; Brandenburg 1964; and Katzin 1964). Peterson and Berger
(1971) as well as Kirzner (1973) hold the opposite view that entrepreneurship
is more likely to be enhanced under turbulent conditions than under stable
conditions. However, others believe that a minimal security or moderate
certainty is necessary (Cole 1959; McClelland 1961 and Kuznets 1966). These
viewpoints contrast the Schumpeterian idea that the essence of
entrepreneurship is to create insecurity in stable conditions (Schumpeter
1961). But, Redlich (1958) suggests that insecurity does not necessarily
decrease entrepreneurship, although it. may result in business loss or fear of
intimidation by some entrepreneurs who will be unlikely to increase their
insecurity by assuming a more entrepreneurial role. We add that as different
kinds of political conflict generate a different mix of political coalitions
and opportunity conditions, different, levels of private pay-offs become
attainable which in turn determine the direction and size of entrepreneurship.
We now examine specific entrepreneurial responses to the mix of
opportunity conditions generated by political instability in Africa.
4. ENTREPRENEURIAL RESPONSES TO POLITICAL INSTABILITY
The pre-independence historical record of African entrepreneurship re-
iterates four themes: First, African entrepreneurship was positively elastic
to political action. That is, the role of political authority was critical
to its success or failure (Iliffe 1981; Hopkins 1.988). Second, the
continent's entrepreneurs were drawn from diverse social, economic and ethnic
groups. Third, the majority of entrepreneurs showed considerable originality
in adapting to their external working environments. Fourth, the
entrepreneurial spirit stimulated a wide range of activities in trading,
artisanal work, farming, transport and small scale manufacturing (Hopkins
1983). These entrepreneurial activities have shifted strategically since the
time of independence to take advantage of political instability or to avoid
its potentially ill effects. Also, the political role of African
entrepreneurs has changed from passive to active agents for reform. The
classic idea of Milton Friedman (1962) that "the business of business is
business" no longer applies here.
African entrepreneurs have performed this new-found role with
considerable self-interest. After nearly two decades of PI and revolutionary
climate in South Africa, characterised by boycotts, worker stay aways,
international sanctions and administrative breakdown in black residential
areas, private sector organisations have formed alliances to promote the cause
of political reform. Even so, these organisations, including black business,
local white business and foreign business, pursue different strategy sets
reflecting their different, power bases and constituencies. Black business
supports and promotes protest strategies but white business rejects them and
rather restricts its involvement to economic issues. Foreign business,
however, deals with a more eclectic range of issues and a wider variety of
strategies. This diversity restrains successful involvement (Lee et al. 1991,
pp.116-124).
Elsewhere in Africa the private sector has largely failed to bring
pressure to bear on governments to relax their domination of public policy for
a more consultative approach. In 1984, the Rawlings Provisional National
Defence Council (PNDC) administration in Ghana decided that the share of the
private sector must exceed that of the public sector by 1991 (Tangri, 1991).
Despite this commitment, the security and revolutionary arms of government
continued to harass indigenous entrepreneurs for unproven offences. The
government failed to protect them from the impact of its market-based reform
policies including devaluations of the local currency, positive and high
interest rates, and unfair competition from cheap imported goods. Further,
government intervention strengthened through stringent rules and regulations
in employment, taxation, investment and import-export procedures. The private
sector responded with anger and frustration and by 1992 more than 500 local
industries had closed down (West Africa 1992, p.1572).
According to a recent World Bank report reflecting a vision of Africa's
economic future, the central role of its entrepreneurs is to stimulate demand
for low-cost products and services that they produce by creating jobs (World
Bank 1989). There is, however, considerable difference of views on which
entrepreneurs, formal or informal, are better disposed to perform this task.
Formal or modern entrepreneurs are those who hire labour and are part of the
formal economy; and informal entrepreneurs are the self-employed or micro-
entrepreneurs who employ unpaid family members and who usually operate outside
official regulations (Marsden 1990, p.2).
The report projects that informal sector employment will rise by 6
percent, annually from 1990 to 2020. The sector's contribution to GDP will
rise by 7.5 percent annually and its labour productivity will increase by 1.5
percent. However, labour productivity in the formal sector is expected to
grow marginally at two percent annually. This means that the formal sector's
contribution to total GDP will decline from 47% to 32%.
This scenario - the expansion of informal entrepreneurship and
contraction of the formal - can also be inferred from the evidence of the
response of Africans in production, commerce and the services to the various
types of political instability. Generally, high intensity political
instability constrains large-scale production and creates the environment
conducive to micro and informal production. Low intensity political
instability such as popular conflict induces informal entrepreneurship in all
sectors. Consequently, the dualistic structure of entrepreneurship tends to
shift towards the informal.
Elite Conflict
In several African countries, elite conflicts explode into military coups
d'etat to usher in new governments with new macro-economic policies including:
price management/liberalisation (such as exchange rate adjustment, reduction
or increase in subsidies); budgetary reform and institutional restructuring
(such as entrepreneurship policy). Invariably, African governments differ in
their attitude toward indigenous entrepreneurs. Some, like the Rawlings
regime, the governments of Guinea, Mali in the 1960s under Keita, Benin, Congo
Brazaville, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Tanzania discouraged indigenous
African entrepreneurs from emerging. The obvious response was the growth of
informal, parallel or black markets. Some used political power to acquire
private property and business interests. This is parasitic capitalism typical
of Zaire and Zambia under Kuanda, the last years of Tubman and the early years
of Tolbert of Liberia. However, the political leaderships in Kenya and
Nigeria have always allowed local entrepreneurs to play an important economic
role (Iliffe 1982, pp.77-87).
Frequent changes in economic policies usually affect public servants,
wage earners and the unemployed the most. Their response is to drift to the
informal sector, thus creating competition and reducing their earning
capacity. To adjust their tastes to' match their declined purchasing power,
they embark on innovative local repairs. When goods become expensive or
scarce, or commodity prices offered to producers are low, informal market-
activities are the popular response. Producers and speculators smuggle to and
from neighbouring countries (Chazan et al. 1988, pp.254-256).
An alternative response, quite popular in Ghana and Nigeria, is for
displaced urban dwellers to "go back to the land", that is return to their
villages of origin to undertake subsistence agricultural production. A few
cases of urban professionals turning to plantation agriculture have, however,
been reported (Ewusi 1987; Chazan et al. 1988, pp.254-256).
Large-scale migration, another adjustment strategy, is dominant in West.
Africa. During the early years of Rawlings' rule, many Ghanaians migrated to
Nigeria and Cote d'lvoire. This meant, in effect, a flight of entrepreneurial
talents to the host countries. However, most, immigrants are usually
restrained from undertaking large-scale, formal business and are obliged to
mount informal enterprises.
Factional Conflict
The political conflict in South Africa, may be considered as a. special
case of factional conflict,taking the form of a racial conflict between blacks
and whites. At the corporate level, it is a conflict between the black owners
of labour and white owners of capital backed by a racist government. As a
result, the private sector functions in an unstable, hostile environment,
characterized internally by the sanctions of political uncertainty at the
workplace and outside it and externally from international economic isolation.
Decades of living under siege have made the industrial sector structurally
uncompetitive and entrepreneurs are concerned more with protection and
survival than with expansion (Financial Week, April 2-8 1992, pp.24-25).
Given the importance of political stability as a consideration for
investors, South Africa ranks 59th just behind China, Poland, Hungary, Israel,
Saudi Arabia and Hong Kong (41st) in the 1991 International Country Risk Guide
of 129 countries of which the US places ninth. In view of South Africa's
relatively unimpressive ranking, its private sector suffers severely from
flight of capital and lack of foreign investment.
Communal Conflict
The evidence on entrepreneurial responses to communal confict is rather
inconclusive. Large-scale agriculture has been difficult under war conditions
although small-scale farming has had mixed fortunes. During the Mozambican
war Lonrho, a multi-national, committed about $20 million in agribusiness
joint venture and was earning about one million dollars profit annually by
1989. However, it spent 15% to 20% of its production cost on hiring private
militias to protect its estates from Renamo attacks. High security cost meant
that only large-scale investment in agriculture could be profitable (African
Business, June 1.991). The war destroyed traditional coping strategies among
farming' communities and undermined the existing exchange entitlement network
(Mozambique Information Office 1992, p.2). The Sudanese experience was
however, different. In the midst of the civil war, the besieged people of
Juba turned faeces-ridden waste ground in the city into food plots to produce
about a third of their basic food requirement (Daily Times, 6 January, 1992,
p.10).
War conditions could also stimulate profitable entrepreneurial
initiatives in eco-tourism and the ivory trade. The rebel war in Rwanda
boosted neighbouring Uganda's tourist industry when bush fighters sent.
Rwanda's mountain gorillas scurrying for safety across the border into Uganda.
The Ugandan government responded by inaugurating a profitable eco-tourism
programme (Africa Analysis, 18 Sept. 1992, p.14). Similarly the war in
Mozambique launched a buoyant ivory trade, for guns and war material but
drastically reduced the country's elephant population from about 55 000 in
1974 to 13 350 in 1992 (New Ground, Spring 1992, pp.18-19).
In mining and general trading, the civil unrest in Zaire and the war in
Angola gave mixed business prospects for South African entrepreneurs. By
November 1991 the turmoil in Zaire had sent cobalt prices from $15.50 in
September to $25.27 (the average price during the 1970 unrest was $70).
Stocks fell fast and as Zaire dominates world production the situation
benefitted South African producers - Rustenburg Platinum and Impala Platinum -
who extract it as a by-product of platinum. South African exporters found
lucrative business in Zaire, from fresh produce, mining and manufacturing
equipment to processed foodstuff, taking advantage of the superior quality and
cheaper prices of their products. The South Africans appeared also in newly
accessible Mozambique, rebuilding hotels, breeding cattle and seeking
contracts for the supply of commodities ranging from plastics to shipbuilding
items (The Star, 9 October 1991; The Citizen 23 April 1992; Business Times,
10 November 1991). However, the $125 million trade between Zaire and South
Africa frequently came to a temporary standstill during periods of looting,
arson and riots in Zaire.
The Angolan war created many other unforseen business opportunities for
the unemployed, Zairean immigrants and local merchants. The brief return to
peace and stability in that country in 1992 meant that patrolling soldiers
in key diamond areas be withdrawn to ensure free mobility. When the
government introduced a law to legalise the right of Angolans to own and sell
diamonds with the aim of mopping up diamond stocks among the population, the
unemployed expressed their entrepreneurial proclivity and did a $500 miJlion-
a-year business in diamond sales (Southern African Economist, October 1992,
p. 40). At the onset of the war in 1975, most of the Portuguese immigrants who
had dominated the private sector left the country. The openings left in a
wide range of skilled and unskilled vocations were filled by Zairean and other
immigrants. Parallel markets opened up everywhere to supplement the centrally
planned economy which could not afford to provide the people's needs. When
the traditional caravan network of long-distance trade collapsed from the
destruction by the war of the country's communication infra-structure, the
merchants in the highland areas grasped the opportunities of air-transport to
ferry goods to other provincial areas. This private enterprise expanded to
reach supply sources in Lisbon, Rio de Janeiro and Paris (Birmingham, 1988).
Other parallel market operations were illegal and inimical to economic
growth. Refugees from the Mozambican civil war flocked to the country's
informal sector. But. it became ruled by Mafia-style entrepreneurs, taking
advantage of the poor and war-displaced people, by hiring them as hawkers to
evade tax. Similarly, the parallel market in politically unstable Sierra
Leone became so pervasive that it impinged on the functioning of the formal
economy. Most foreign exchange transactions including exports, imports and
8migrant remittances were channelled through this market due to lack of
confidence in the country's political and economic management (African
Economic Digest, 13 July 1992).
Popular Conflict
Socio-economic conditions in most African countries reveal sustained
deprivation and neglect. These circumstances induce collective informal
entrepreneurship within community groups. The groups conduct self-help
schemes, operate occupational collectives and undertake profitable commercial
ventures. Others, however, run smuggling and black market syndicates which
could be socially undesirable. The frustrations of popular conflict manifest
themselves also in petty thefts, industrial sabotage, embezzlement, armed
robbery, thuggery, tax evasion and other forms of criminal entrepreneurship
(Chazan et ad. 1988, p.199).
The policy of apartheid illustrates an extreme case of this type of
conflict. Apartheid literally means that the black communities in South
Africa were relatively deprived of basic human needs. Their response was to
evolve a distinctive, informal sub-culture, an informal means of human
expression and survival. For example, they introduced shebeens as underground
focal points for recreation similar to the British public house and the
American speakeasy, when the white regime prohibited the consumption of
"European" alcohol (Nkosi, 1965, p.14; Sampson, 1956, p.703; Nakasa, 1975,
p.57; Hart, 1991, p.77). Similarly stokvels or rotating savings and credit
associations became an immensely popular means by which blacks acquired
venture capital in a society where they were deprived access to formal sources
of finance. The informal culture is so deep-seated that transforming
informal, black entrepreneurship into formal types, is one of the major-
problems in South Africa's transition to a non-racial, economic democracy.
5. CONCLUSION
A curvilinear relationship between political instability and private
entrepreneurship can be implied from the African experience. Entrepreneurs
operating large manufacturing enterprises have been adversely affected
particularly by high-intensity political instability such as wars. Prolonged
interruptions to production, insecurity and uncertainty have squeezed many out
of business. At the same time the trading business has become lucrative.
Also, both high and low intensity PI have provided favourable sets of
opportunity conditions for micro and informal entrepreneurship. The evidence
suggests further that socially unproductive black-market activities are
widespread, which means that private profits are considerable. In effect,
African entrepreneurs have reacted rationally to a wide range of politically
unstable situations.
Political instability has modified features of African entrepreneurship
in various notable ways. Industrial entrepreneurs have reacted to the
disastrous impact of instability on their sector by consulting more frequently
with their governments than ever before to influence public policy. However,
the interactions are not always cordial. Besides, two changes have
accompanied the preponderance of informal business. First, a new breed of
operators has joined the sector. This includes well-educated or highly-
skilled public-sector workers who have lost their jobs, those seeking to
supplement their incomes, and families displaced by conflict particularly the
more vulnerable women and children. Moreover, the new breed are more
sophisticated in their innovations such as substituting for imported inputs
and creating new markets under chaotic political conditions.
9The expansion of the informal sector indicates the capacity of the
entrepreneurs for adjustment and survival. But the sector alone provides
neither the panacea nor the basis for sustained economic development. African
entrepreneurs have shown also that given growth-directed incentives from the
mixed fortunes of political instability, they have the potential and dynamism
to undertake productive economic activities on a wider scale. A successful,
policy to promote productive entrepreneurship will depend on government-
business coalitions accomplished to protect the interests of both parties
while seeking to maximize national welfare. Nonetheless, this scenario is
improbable for practical reasons.
We have depicted the modern African government as a fragile, insecure
institution constantly drawn into various types of institutional conflicts
with its constituencies. Consequently, it is difficult to imagine that
governments will engage their business sectors in mutually trustworthy
coalitions. Coalitions are least likely in Tanzania, Ghana, Benin, Angola and
Mozambique where evidence of African socialism or anti-entrepreneurship policy
is common. In Zaire, Ivory Coast and Zambia where parasitic capitalism was
practised by the political elites any coalitions are likely to be shaky. The
most, probable scenario could be found in Nigeria and Kenya where post-
independence governments have consistently nurtured indigenous
entrepreneurship (Iliffe 1983, pp.64-87). Ultimately, African governments
will have to show transparency, openness, predictability and the rule of law
to win the confidence of their entrepreneur class.
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